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Smile Curves in Global Value Chains:  
Multinationals vs Domestic Firms; the U.S. vs China 
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Abstract: This paper uses the “smile curve” mapping tool with a Y-axis for value-added 
ratio and an X-axis for production stages to identify value-added gains, positions, and 
interdependencies of multinationals and domestic firms along global value chains 
(GVCs). Taking the U.S. and China’s ICT firms’ exporting activities as a target, we find 
that China’s domestic ICT firms’ value chain appears as a smile curve differing from the 
U.S. domestic ICT firms’ inverted-U curve, which reflects the considerable difference in 
their technical specialization in joining GVCs; multinationals are good at utilizing each 
country’s comparative advantages and can thus arrange value chains as smile curves 
regardless of whether they are located in the U.S. or in China; China’s domestic firms 
have increasingly plugged into most ICT value chains. All findings reflect how “sticky” 
the interdependency among countries along GVCs is and can thus help understanding 
the impact of the U.S.–China trade war. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Global Value Chains (GVCs) divide the production process so that goods may be produced 
in stages in a number of different countries with a little value-added at each stage in 
accordance with each country’s comparative advantages (Krugman, 1991). Given the 
rapid development of GVCs over the past three decades, the “Made in” label, typical of 
manufactured goods (ranging from large planes to small electronic devices), which 
attributes them to a specific economy, has become an archaic symbol of a bygone era as 
most manufactured goods are now “Made in the World” (WTO-IDE, 2011). The 
phenomenon of the rise of GVCs, which accompanied a substantial improvement in the 
economic efficiency of multinationals, has significantly changed the nature and structure 
of international trade (Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark, 2011; WTO, 2019) as well as the 
topology of interdependency and influencing powers among countries (Xiao et al., 2020). 
According to a recent report (UNCTAD, 2013), 80% of trade takes place in “value chains” 
linked to transnational corporations. Furthermore, as shown in Cadestin et al., (2019), 
“multinationals account for roughly for one-half of international trade, one-third of 
output and GDP and one-fourth of employment in the global economy.” 
Meanwhile, the complexity and sophistication of GVCs due to the increasing 
inter- and intra-firm trade of intermediate goods and services, which may cross several 
national borders multiple times, have also created considerable difficulties, such as those 
in understanding “who creates added value for whom” and in formulating policies that 
enable countries, industries, and firms with different ownership to clearly identify their 
positions, gains, and potential risks in joining or engaging in GVCs. Better 
understanding on this issue has very important policy implications as pointed out by the 
so-called “Paradoxical Pair of Concerns” (Baldwin et al., 2014) for both developed and 
developing countries when they join GVCs. That is to say, owing to the differences in 
comparative advantages across countries participating in GVCs, rich countries might 
tend to engage in high-end and intangible production activities, such as R&D, design, 
and brand building in the upstream stages and after-sales services and marketing in the 
downstream stages. Consequently, rich countries might worry about the hollowing out of 
their economies as manufacturing jobs are offshored to low-technology, low-wage 
countries. Meanwhile, poor countries might tend to focus on low-end and tangible 
production activities, such as manufacturing and assembly, and might therefore have 
concerns that they are getting the wrong types of jobs and that their economies might be 
locked into GVCs at the bottom (low-end) of the so-called “smile curve.” 
The concept of the smile curve was first proposed around 1992 by Stan Shih, the 
founder of Acer, a technology company headquartered in Taiwan. Shih (1996) observed 
that in the personal computer industry, both ends of the value chain command higher 
value-added to the product than the middle part of the value chain. If this phenomenon 
is presented in a graph with value-added represented on the Y-axis and the value chain 
(stages of production located in different places) represented on the X-axis, the resulting 
curve appears in the shape of a smile. The logic of the smile curve has been widely used 
and discussed in the business literature of GVCs (e.g., Dedrick and Kraemer, 1998; 
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Mudambi, 2008; Shin et al., 2012, etc.). Its theoretical explanation could be traced in the 
context of GVCs to three lines of literature.1  They include the business literature 
concerning the value chain model (Porter, 1985), GVC governance (Gereffi et al., 2005), 
the organizational choices of firms involved in supply chains (Antràs and Helpman, 2008; 
Acemoglu et al., 2009; Antràs and Chor, 2013; Alfaro et al., 2015), and the international 
trade literature concerning trade in tasks and fragmentation production (Jones and 
Kierzkowski, 1990; Feenstra, 1998; Arndt, 1997; Campa and Goldberg, 1997, Yeats, 2001, 
Hummels, Ishii and Yi, 2001; Yi, 2003, Grossman and Helpman, 2002a, b; Hanson et al., 
2003; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008; Timmer et al., 2014, 2018).  
However, the smile curve phenomenon has rarely been identified, measured, or 
evaluated by employing real data with explicit consideration of international production 
networks. A few studies have tried to identify the smile curve phenomenon using input–
output (IO) data at the industrial level (Kimura, 2003; 2006; Baldwin et al., 2014), firm 
level (Saliola and Zanfei, 2009; Rungi and Del Prete, 2018), or using project-level FDI 
data (Stöllinger, 2019), and none of them have explicitly considered value-added 
propagation processes and country-sector positions along all stages of the value chain. 
Ye et al. (2015) provided the pioneering idea in identifying smile curves in GVCs, followed 
by Ito and Vézina (2016) and Meng et al. (2020). The originality and innovation of these 
works is that they consistently combine both the so-called “trade in value-added” concept 
(see Johnson and Noguera, 2012; Koopman et al., 2014; Los et al., 2016) in measuring 
value-added gains of countries and sectors along GVCs and the value-added propagation 
length (see Antràs et al. 2012; Miller and Temurshoev, 2013; Chen, 2014; Wang et al., 
2017) in measuring positions of countries and industries along GVCs. However, in what 
is similar to the previously mentioned literature, one of the most critical comments 
regarding these smile curve research studies is that no performance of multinationals 
that are considered the main players of GVCs can be explicitly identified in the existing 
smile curve analyses.  
Concerning the role of multinationals in GVCs, a massive number of case 
studies (e.g., Linden et al., 2009; Dedrick et al., 2010; Xing and Detert, 2010; Xing, 2019, 
2020) have been developed. These studies rely on “tear down” analyses that assign the 
value of individual components to source companies and their countries. These firm- and 
product-based case studies can provide intuitive understanding of GVCs in terms of the 
activities of multinationals. However, these “tear down” case studies only focus on the 
supply chain of a specific firm and particular products and are clearly not representative 
of the broader role of production networks and inter-industrial or inter-firm linkages in 
the whole value creation process.  
Owing to the recent novel data developed by the OECD, the analytical Activities 
of Multinational Enterprises (AMNE) database (including Inter-Country IO tables split 
according to firm ownership over the period 2005–2016; see Cadestin, et al., 2018a) 
makes analyses of multinational production in value-added terms possible (see Cadestin, 
et al., 2018b, 2019; Miroudot and Ye, 2019, 2020). This database also enables us to fill 
                                                        
1 For a detailed genealogical map of theoretical frameworks for GVCs, one can refer to Inomata 
(2017). 
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the gap between approaches mentioned above in measuring smile curves in GVCs. With 
this new data, we borrow the smile curve concept and focus on Information and 
Communications Technology (ICT), including many representative fragmentation 
products (e.g., smartphones, PCs) exporting firms located in China and the U.S. We aim 
to identify value-added gains, positions, and interdependencies of both domestic and 
multinational firms when they participate in GVCs. Understanding the gains from GVCs 
and their distribution pattern across countries, sectors, and firm ownership is crucial for 
policymakers in the context of reconsidering how world trade and production work. So is 
having a better understanding of the nature and the impact of the recent U.S.–China 
trade conflict, along with better international governance in the era of GVCs.  
 
2. Method and Data 
2.1 Conceptual GVC setting for measuring smile curves 
 
GVCs can be shown from various perspectives. To give a better mapping of the geometry 
of GVCs, we first need to give a clear conceptual setting about what we are going to 
measure. The most popular and simple approach is to focus on the export of a specific 
product produced by a specific type of firm and to look at how value is added from one 
country, sector, or type of firm to another country, sector, or type of firm throughout the 
entirety of production networks, along with how the product is ultimately consumed. For 
example, we can use Chinese domestic firms’ ICT exports to the world market as a 
starting point for separating the whole value chain into upstream stages and 
downstream stages. All countries, sectors, and different types of firms that directly and 
indirectly provide intermediate goods and services to the production of ICT exports are 
considered participants in the upstream stages along the value chain. All countries, 
sectors, and different types of firms involved in the distribution process of those ICT 
products to world consumers are considered participants in the downstream stages.  
 With regard to how to visualize the above conceptual GVC, we need two 
fundamental measures. The first measure is used to express the magnitude of the benefit 
(i.e., the absolute gain of value-added) for countries, sectors, and firms that are involved 
in GVCs. The second measure is the distance between producers and consumers in the 
value-added propagation process, which can be used to identify the position of a country, 
sector, or firm in a GVC. These two measures have been propounded by Ye et al. (2015) 
and expounded by Meng et al. (2020). In the following sections, we simplify the 
terminology of mathematics used in their methods. 
 
2.2 Value-added gains from exporting 
 
Following the definition of trade in value-added (TiVA: Johnson and Noguera, 
2012), we can use an IO model to measure value-added gains induced by exporting final 
goods and services. The advantage of using TiVA is that it can trace value-added created 
upstream (GDP by sector) and absorbed downstream (final demands by product) without 
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any double counting because all transaction of intermediates across countries, sectors, 
and firms are treated as endogenous variables (see Koopman et al., 2014).  
For ease of explanation, consider a closed national IO model as follows: 
 
𝐱 = 𝐀𝐱 + 𝐲,        (1) 
 
where 𝐱 is the N × 1 gross output vector with N sectors, 𝐲 is the N × 1 final demand 
vector, and 𝐀 is the N × N input coefficient matrix (the share of intermediate input in 
output). In other words, all gross output (total supply) must be used either as an 
intermediate product or as a final product (total demand). This equation expresses the 
ex-post equilibrium of market supply and demand in a closed economy. After rearranging 
terms, we have the following: 
 
𝐱 =  (𝐈 − 𝐀)−𝟏𝐲 = 𝐋𝐲,       (2) 
 
where 𝐋 denotes the N × N block matrix, commonly known as a Leontief inverse, which 
is the total requirement matrix that gives the amount of gross output required for a one-
unit increase in final demand. We define 𝐯 as a 1 × N value-added coefficient vector. 
Each element (vs) in 𝐯 shows the share of value-added in the gross output of sector s. 
Then, we can measure the value-added gained (𝛑k) by sector induced by exports (𝐞k) of a 
final product k as follows: 
 
𝛑k = ?̂?𝐋𝐞k,        (3) 
 
where, ?̂? is the diagonal matrix of 𝐯, 𝐞k is the N × 1 vector, with just an element of the 
exported final product k. Without loss of generality, this model can be applied to an inter-
country input–output (ICIO) model. 
 
2.3 GVC position index 
By definition, in an IO system, the following equation always holds true: 
 
𝐯𝐋 = 𝐯(𝐈 + 𝐀 + 𝐀𝟐 + 𝐀𝟑 + ⋯ ) = 𝐮′      (4) 
 
where 𝐮′ denotes the transformed 𝐮 (an N × 1 unit vector). The value-added (𝐯s) of a 
specific sector s induced by the final demand (𝐲k) of a specific product k can be given as 
𝐯s𝐋𝐲k (a scalar). Following Antràs et al. (2012) and Meng et al. (2020), the distance from 
a specific sector s (value-added creator) to consumers of a specific final product k, can be 
defined as follows: 
 
Dsk = 𝐯s(1𝐈 + 2𝐀 + 3𝐀
𝟐 + 4𝐀𝟑 + ⋯ )𝐲k/𝐯s𝐋𝐲k = 𝐯s𝐋
2𝐲k/𝐯s𝐋𝐲k.    (5) 
 
The aforementioned indicator measures the total number of value-added propagation 
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steps, on average, when the value-added of a specific sector upstream is embodied in all 
downstream steps and ultimately reaches the final demand of a specific product. Without 
loss of generality, this distance measure could be applied to the ICIO model as well. 
 
2.4 Data 
 
Data used is the OECD analytical AMNE database, wherein the conventional ICIO 
tables are split according to firm ownership (D: domestic- and F: foreign-owned) over the 
period 2005–2016, with 60 economies (including the “rest of the world” as one economy) 
and 34 sectors in the ISIC Rev. 4 classification at the basic price.2 It should be noted that 
foreign-owned firms are defined as foreign affiliates who have at least 50% foreign 
ownership and that domestic-owned firms include domestic multinationals (domestic 
firms with foreign affiliates) and domestic firms not involved in international investment. 
The layout of this table with N sectors (N=34), G economies (G=60), and 2 types of firms 
is shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. The layout of the OECD inter-country input–output tables with firm ownership 
information included 
 
 
 
Note: 𝐙FD
12  is the N × N matrix representing the exports of intermediates produced by 
foreign-owned firms located in Country 1 used by Country 2’s domestic firms; 𝐘F
12 is the 
N × 1 vector representing the exports of final products produced by foreign-owned firms 
located in country 1, used by Country 2. X: the 2NG × 1 column vector of output; Va: the 
1 × 2NG row vector of value-added. For detailed information about country or regional 
sector classification, one can refer to Appendices 1 and 2. For data explanation, see 
Cadestin et al. (2018a). 
 
                                                        
2 Main data sources used in compiling the OECD AMNE–ICIO tables include the OECD–ICIO tables, 
OECD–AMNE statistics, National accounts, and other National sources, Trade by Enterprise 
Characteristics and Services Trade by Enterprise Characteristics (TEC), Micro-level databases. 
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3. Empirical Results 
 
3.1 How to map the geometry of GVCs 
 
By first employing the yearly AMNE–ICIO data to derive binomial regression and then 
labeling the most important participants (country-sector-firm) with value-added gain 
(represented by the size of circles) above a threshold percentage (e.g., 0.1% of the total 
induced value-added in the whole value chain) in both upstream and downstream stages, 
a map of the ICT exports-related GVCs can be created. As shown in the figures of the 
next section, the Y-axis denotes the value-added ratio (value-added gained by producing 
one unit US$ worth of output). The X-axis denotes position, measured by the value-added 
propagation length between global consumers of ICT products and a specific 
participating firm in a specific industry along the corresponding value chain (a kind of 
normalized distance to consumers3). The smooth line is fitted by binomial regression 
smoothing, and the shadowed area represents the confidence interval around the smooth 
line (for detailed robustness check on the GVC position index and the shape of smile 
curves, one can refer to Appendices 3 and 4). This GVC mapping can help us identify 
whether the so-called “smile curve” exists, and if so, what the participants (countries, 
sectors, and firms) of a specific value chain, as well as their positions and gains, look like. 
 
3.2 Value-added gains in Chinese domestic ICT firms’ export-related value chain 
 
As shown in Figures 1-a and 1-b, the value chain for Chinese domestic ICT firms’ 
exports to the world market clearly appears as a “smile curve” (to save space here, we 
show only 2005 and 2016). Several stylized facts can be observed from these curves. 
1) Chinese domestic ICT firms (CHN_D13) were located at the middle–bottom (low-end) 
of the smile curve although they constituted the largest beneficiary in terms of value-
added gain, the reasons for which are several. First, the participation pattern of 
Chinese domestic ICT firms in GVCs at the early stage of China’s economic 
development was to export labor-intensive assembly products, partly including the 
acceptance of foreign outsourcing tasks, because of cheap labor costs and abundant 
labor supply inside China and the lack of industrial capital and technology. When 
compared with the traditional production process, the assembly process depends on 
a greater amount of parts and components, including imported intermediates. This 
makes the value-added ratio of Chinese domestic ICT firms very low, thus explaining 
their location at the lowest position in this smile curve. This is also the reason for 
which many other domestic firms as well as foreign countries that directly and  
                                                        
3 Our position measure as shown in Equation 2 represents the distance from a specific industry to 
consumers who consume a specific final product. In other words, the bigger this measure the further 
the industry from the consumers. Therefore, when putting this industry along the X-axis (the bigger its 
X-axis figure the closer the industry to the consumers), we need to make an inverse transformation for 
the distance Dsk, such as by using a specific value (e.g., the maximum value of all industries’ distances 
to industry k upstream: max (D.k)) minus the Dsk value. 
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Figure 1a. Chinese domestic ICT firms’ export-related value chain (2005) 
 
 
 
Figure 1b. Chinese domestic ICT firms’ export-related value chain (2016) 
 
indirectly provide intermediate products to Chinese domestic ICT firms have been 
involved in the upstream segment of this value chain. In addition, to deliver those 
assembly ICT products to users around the world, foreign after-services industries 
are also needed. Thus, more foreign countries are involved in the downstream stages 
of this value chain. Therefore, Chinese domestic ICT firms are naturally located in 
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the middle–bottom of this smile curve. The value-added gain, then, is self-evident, as 
Chinese domestic ICT firms were the most direct player in the production of ICT 
exports. 
2) Many other Chinese domestic firms in different sectors (e.g., in the 2005 case, 
CNH_D21: Wholesale and retail; CHN_D22: Transportation; CHN_D2: Mining; 
CHN_D11: Basic Metals; CHN_19: Electricity; CHN_8: Chemicals) also benefited by 
participating in the upstream stages of this value chain. This was because most of 
the intermediate inputs directly and indirectly needed by the Chinese domestic ICT 
firms to produce exports were presumed to come from other Chinese domestic firms.  
3) Other countries’ (regions) domestic firms located in the upstream position of this 
value chain also obtained a relatively large portion of value-added gain, particularly 
their ICT firms (TWN_D13, KOR_D13, JPN_D13, USA_D13, for the 2005 case). This 
clearly shows the strong cross-border, intra-industrial linkages between China and 
the US as well as linkages with other East Asian economies. This is partly because 
of the relatively broad industry classification of ICT in the AMNE (broader 
classification used, more intra-industrial transaction appears). In addition, we can 
also see that other countries’ domestic non-ICT firms located in much higher 
upstream stages could also enjoy value-added gains by joining this value chain. They 
include many business services providers (USA_D29, JPN_D29, KOR_D29), as well 
as some manufacturing intermediate suppliers (JPN_D14: Electrical equipment, 
JPN_D11: Basic metals, JPN_D8: Chemicals). This reflects the level of inter-
industrial linkages between China and foreign economies. 
4) Although the value-added gain was not substantial, it can still be easily identified in 
the upstream stage of this value chain for 2005, with the existence of beneficiaries, 
including both multinationals located in China (CHN_F29: Business services, 
CHN_F13: ICT) and abroad (SGP_F13: ICT; TWN_F13: ICT; THA_F13: ICT, 
USA_F21: Business Services). This reflects the fact that multinationals, both inside 
and outside China, have also been involved in Chinese domestic ICT firm value 
chains through the provision of intermediate goods directly and indirectly although 
their presence was not substantial when compared with that of domestic firms. This 
is likely because most of those multinationals located in China focus on the 
production of final products rather than intermediates.  
5) The main beneficiaries in the downstream stage of this value chain include service 
industries, such as Wholesale and Retail (21) and Transportation (22) in the U.S., 
Japan, the UK, Mexico, and France. This can be explained by the fact that China’s 
domestic firms’ ICT products were mainly exported to these countries, which had to 
be delivered to their countries’ domestic consumers mainly through the use of 
domestic and international wholesale and transportation services provided by both 
their domestic and multinational firms. 
Upon examining the evolution of Chinese domestic ICT firms’ exports-related 
smile curves over time, no significant change in the shape of this curve is seen, but some 
remarkable structural changes concerning the participating countries and firms can be 
observed. 
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1) More Chinese domestic manufacturing firms have been involved in the upstream 
stage of this value chain. Their share of value-added gain in the whole chain 
increased from 26.3% to 38.9% over time (note the change in the corresponding circle 
size between 2005 and 2016). This is mainly because Chinese domestic 
manufacturing firms experienced a relatively quick industrial upgrading over this 
period and can thus provide more complex intermediate inputs to Chinese domestic 
ICT firms as a replacement for foreign imports. For instance, JPN_D14, JPN_D11, 
JPN_D8 appeared in 2005 and were largely replaced by the corresponding Chinese 
domestic firms (CHN_D14, CHN_D11, CHN_D8) in 2016.  
2) More Chinese domestic service firms have been involved in the upstream stage of 
this value chain; meanwhile, their value-added gains account for a much larger 
portion than those of other manufacturing firms do. In addition, in 2005, the largest 
upstream beneficiaries were the traditional service providers, domestic wholesale 
and retail (CHN_D22), and transportation firms (CHN_D21), while in 2016, domestic 
financial and insurance firms (CHN_D27) and other business services firms 
(CNH_29) showed a remarkable increasing presence, which took over the share 
provided by the U.S., Japan, and Korea’s domestic services firms (USA_D29, 
JPN_D29, KOR_D29). This clearly reflects the ongoing domestic-oriented 
servitization of the whole ICT value chain in China since the time increasingly 
modern domestic services have been embodied in China’s ICT exports. 
3) The value-added ratio of the U.S. domestic ICT firms (USA_D13) that were the most 
important foreign suppliers of intermediate goods in the upstream of this value chain 
increased from 56.4% in 2005 to 81.6% in 2016, while the figure for China’s domestic 
ICT firms (CHN_D13) declined slightly, from 24.6% in 2005, to 22.4% in 2016. This 
reflects the fact that the U.S. domestic ICT firms increasingly concentrated on high-
tech production of more complex intermediate goods (e.g., computer processors), 
whereas Chinese domestic ICT firms even then took on more tasks, such as 
assembling final products using low-skilled labor. This result is very consistent with 
the existing literature (Ye et al., 2015 and Meng et al., 2020). 
4) Multinational ICT firms in China (CHN_F13) enhanced their participation in the 
upstream of this value chain by providing intermediate goods to Chinese domestic 
ICT firms directly and indirectly as a means of realizing more value-added gain. This 
is probably because, increasingly, Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese domestic ICT 
firms (JPN_D13, KOR_D13, TWN_D13) located upstream as intermediate goods 
providers to Chinese domestic ICT firms moved their production capacity to China 
to be much closer to their consumer. This can be confirmed by the shrinking share of 
value-added gain for JPA_D13 (66.7% down), KOR_D13 (75.9% down), and 
TWN_D13 (76.2% down) and the increasing share of CHN_F13 (5.8 times greater) in 
the 2016 figure when compared with the corresponding value-added gains in the 
2005 figure. 
5) Some developing countries’ services firms (ROW_D21, MEX_D21, ROW_D22, 
BRA_D21, RUS_D21, IND_D21) enhanced their participation at the downstream 
stage of this value chain. This reflects the fact that those countries imported more 
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Chinese ICT products, including both intermediate goods and final products, which 
need to be shipped to their domestic users. Thus, their domestic services firms 
(wholesale, retail, and transportation) are able to enjoy more value-added gain.  
 
 
 
Figure 2a. China-based multinational ICT firms’ export-related value chain (2005) 
 
 
 
Figure 2b. China-based multinational ICT firms’ export-related value chain (2016) 
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3.2 Value-added gains in the China-based multinational ICT firms’ export-related value 
chain 
 
Figures 2-a and 2-b show the participants’ value-added gains as well as their positions 
in the value chain related to China-based multinational ICT firms’ exports. Both clearly 
appear in the form of “smile curves.” When compared with the smile curves related to 
Chinese domestic ICT firm exports (Figures 1-a and 1-b) over time, a few findings can be 
gleaned: 
1) The position of China-based multinational ICT firms’ exports (CHN_F13) was at the 
middle–bottom of the value chain, which is similar to the position of Chinese 
domestic ICT-exporting firms (CHN_D13) in Figures 1a and 1b. However, the share 
of CHN_F13’s value-added gain and its position in Figures 2a and 2b were smaller 
and lower than those of CHN_D13 were in Figures 1a and 1b, respectively. This is 
mainly because almost half of China-based multinational ICT firms are doing 
processing trade, which is more labor-intensive and requires more imported 
intermediate input when compared with Chinese domestic ICT-exporting firms. 
2) When compared with Figure 1a, more foreign domestic firms were involved in the 
upstream stage of the value chain (Figure 2a). The share of value-added gain for 
these firms in the upstream stage of the value chain was 36.9% in Figure 2a, which 
was much greater than that in Figure 1a (27.6%). On the one hand, this is consistent 
with the fact that many China-based multinational ICT firms are doing processing 
exports, which need a more substantial amount of intermediate inputs from other 
countries. On the other hand, this also reflects the fact that multinational ICT value 
chains have more variation in arranging intermediate inputs from different locations 
and types of firms.  
3) There is no significant change in the shape of this value chain between 2005 and 
2016, but a similar structural change concerning the participating members 
upstream can be clearly observed. To be precise, Chinese domestic firms, including 
those involved in both manufacturing and services, enhanced their industrial 
upgrading, thus replacing foreign firms as suppliers of intermediate goods and 
services to China-based multinational ICT firms (the share of value-added gain by 
Chinese domestic firms upstream increased from 28.2% to 44.6% over the period). 
This fact can also be partly confirmed by a recent case study having to do with the 
iPhone X (Xing, 2020): Chinese companies “contributed 25% of the value-added to 
the iPhone X.” 
 
3.3 Value-added gains in the U.S. domestic ICT firms’ export-related value chain 
 
Figures 3-a and 3-b show the mapping result for the value chain in terms of the U.S. 
domestic ICT firms’ exports. A U-shaped smile curve cannot be clearly identified. Value 
chains may not always look like a smile curve, particularly for the U.S.’ domestic ICT 
firms. The main features of these figures and their changes over time are summarized 
as follows: 
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Figure 3a. The U.S. domestic ICT firms’ export-related value chain (2005) 
 
 
 
Figure 3b. The U.S. domestic ICT firms’ export-related value chain (2016) 
 
1) The relatively higher value-added ratio of the U.S.’ domestic ICT firms when 
compared with that of other participants upstream and downstream along this value 
chain is the main reason that it does not look like a smile curve. This ratio even 
increased from 56.4% to 81.6% between 2005 and 2016, which made the curve 
assume a somewhat inverted-U shape. This clearly reflects the fact that producing 
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one unit of output by the U.S.’ domestic ICT firms can create more value-added. This 
is probably due to the fact that more high-skilled laborers with higher wages, and 
more sophisticated capital with higher rent are used in these firms. 
2) In 2005, there were still many domestic manufacturing firms involved in the 
upstream stage of this value chain, but in 2016, many of them disappeared, with only 
Fabricated Metals (USA_12) and Chemicals (USA_D8) showing a presence as a 
supplier of intermediates. The share of value-added gain of these firms was 23.6% in 
2005 but shrunk to 9.3% in 2016. Something similar happened to foreign domestic 
manufacturing firms located upstream in this value chain (the share of their value-
added gain declined from 8.4% to 3.4% over the period). In 2016, only ICT firms 
located in China (CHN_D13 and CHN_F13) enjoyed a value-added gain by joining 
the upstream stage of this value chain. The change is also reflected by the expanding 
share of value-added gain by USA_D13 in this value chain, from 55.9% in 2005 to 
77.9% in 2016. Therefore, we can conclude that the US domestic ICT firms’ value 
chain has experienced significant technological upgrading, which has transitioned to 
the production of very high value-added products (depending on the availability of 
high-skilled labor and high-tech capital) without relying on more domestic and 
foreign intermediate input. Those products (being traced at a more detailed product 
level by trade statistics) include units of automatic data processing machines 
(HS847150, accounting for about 6.3% of their ICT exports), surgical instruments 
and appliances, and electro-diagnostic apparatus (HS901819, accounting for about 
2.9% of their ICT exports).  
 
3.4 Value-added gains in the U.S.-based multinational ICT firms’ export-related value 
chain 
 
Figures 4-a and 4-b show the mapping results for the value chain in terms of the U.S.-
based multinational ICT firms’ exports, which clearly appear as “smile curves.” When 
compared with previous figures, the main findings can be presented as follows: 
1) The pattern of value chains shown in Figures 4a and 4b is very similar to that in 
Figures 2a and 2b. To be precise, the production of multinational ICT firms’ exports 
in both China and the U.S. depended highly on a large amount of intermediate input 
provided by both domestic and foreign suppliers at the upstream stages of the value 
chain. This is probably because the U.S. economy is big enough with a relatively large 
differential of primary costs across states; thus, multinational ICT firms can still 
arrange their value chains to produce assembly products and export them to the 
world market. Another factor possibly contributing to this phenomenon is that most 
U.S.-based multinational ICT firms’ exports are final goods although they might be 
different from those made by China-based multinational ICT firms in terms of 
quality and function (we cannot identify the difference because of the broad 
classification of sectors used in the data).  
2) As mentioned earlier, China has experienced relatively rapid industrial upgrading, 
which has also enabled more Chinese domestic manufacturing firms (CHN_D13: ICT, 
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CHN_D11: Basic metals, CHN_D14: Electrical equipment, CHN_D8: Chemicals) 
with lower value-added ratios to be suppliers of intermediate goods in a position that 
is upstream of U.S.-based multinational firms in the value chain. This also makes 
this smile curve much flatter. Simultaneously, Chinese domestic financial and 
insurance (CHN_D27) and business services (CHN_D29) firms could also get value-
added gain from this value chain. This is mainly because more services are embodied 
in Chinese domestic firm-produced intermediate goods used directly and indirectly 
by U.S.-based multinational ICT firms.  
 
 
Figure 4a. The U.S.-based multinational ICT firms’ export-related value chain (2005) 
 
 
Figure 4b. The U.S.-based multinational ICT firms’ export-related value chain (2016) 
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4. Conclusion 
 
With U.S.-based and China-based multinational ICT firms’ exporting activities over the 
period 2005–2016 as our analytical target, our empirical results show that the value 
chains in terms of China-based multinational ICT firm exports clearly appear as “smile 
curves,” wherein the ICT-exporting firms take the largest portion of value-added gain 
but only obtain very low value-added per unit exported. Thus, they are located at the 
low-end along these curves. This result is very evident for China-based multinational 
ICT firms in much the same way as the findings from the case study on iPhone’s supply 
chain. The value chain, as it relates to the U.S. domestic ICT firms’ exports, shows a 
much steeper inverted-U-shaped smile curve over time, in which the U.S. domestic ICT 
firms take the majority of value-added gain with much less usage of intermediate inputs 
provided by both domestic and foreign firms over time. This result clearly reflects the 
quick technology upgrading and specialization of U.S. domestic ICT firms, which can 
create more value-added per unit of output, relying on more domestic, high-skilled labor 
and sophisticated capital. The value chains in terms of U.S.-based multinational ICT 
firms’ exports also clearly appear as “smile curves,” implying that multinationals can 
still find opportunities in the U.S. to arrange value chains as they do in China because 
the U.S. economy is big enough with large differentials of primary costs across states as 
well as the ease of importing cheaper intermediate goods with lower import tariff rates 
from the world market. Our results also show that more Chinese domestic firms 
including both manufacturing and services suppliers have been increasingly involved at 
the upstream stage of almost all smile curves identified. This clearly reflects the quick 
industrial upgrading happening in China, which has enabled more Chinese domestic 
firms to replace other suppliers in GVCs.  
On the basis of the foregoing findings, we can discuss several highly important 
policy implications on the recent bilateral trade conflicts between the U.S. and China. 
First, the recent U.S.–China trade conflicts are due to very complex political, economic, 
institutional, and cultural factors, which are clearly beyond the scope of our smile curve 
analyses. However, on the basis of our results, at least from the economic perspective, 
we can say that GVCs could play a very important role as an automatic stabilizer of those 
trade conflicts. This is mainly because the development of GVCs is an irreversible 
process of the ongoing globalization, which is mainly based on each country’s 
comparative advantages dominated by firms rather than governments; thus, the whole 
economic efficiency could be guaranteed in the long run. Any exogenous nonmarket shock 
might tentatively impact GVCs but cannot change the fact that GVCs do follow market 
mechanisms. Further, the context of the current U.S.-China trade conflicts is totally 
different from those of previous U.S.–Japan trade conflicts, which occurred during 1970–
1980. For example, the U.S. and Japan were competitors in exporting cars during 1970–
1980, but the U.S. and China are both competitors and collaborators in producing ICT 
products (e.g., smart phones) in the era of GVCs. Without the existence of a competition–
collaboration dynamic, nobody can imagine how such high-quality and cheap (referring 
to its function) smart phones can be produced (assembled) in China and exported all over 
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the world, while bringing substantial benefits to our lives, as well as how the massive 
investment in R&D for innovation in the U.S. could be paid off. This relationship can be 
clearly recognized in almost all ICT smile curves visualized in the paper.  
On the other hand, the value creation along GVCs mainly follows the market 
mechanism although there is no guarantee that the distribution of value-added gain 
across countries, sectors, firms, or individuals has been accepted by individuals as 
income could always remain equal. This relates not only to the income distribution and 
redistribution systems adopted domestically, for example, the growing wage gap across 
sectors with different levels of GVC involvement or between high-skilled and low-skilled 
labor inside some high-level GVC-participating sectors (for further discussion on the U.S., 
see Meng et al., 2020; on European countries, see Parteka and Wolszczak-Derlacz, 2019) 
but also to the global income distribution pattern in terms of income shifts among 
multinationals. Examples of this include: “U.S. companies have become more active at 
shifting income out of the United States…” (see Klassen and Laplante, 2012), 
“…multinational firms alter the distribution of reported profits to take advantage of 
losses…” (Simone et al., 2017). This fact has, at least in part, been a driver of the 
backlash against globalization and the breaking out of trade conflicts between the U.S. 
and China. 
 Finally, there is a sticky interdependency between the U.S. and China. As both 
competitors and collaborators along almost all ICT value chains, the so-called 
“Paradoxical Pair of Concerns” (Baldwin et al., 2014) has been widely recognized by both 
sides. China would not want to be locked in at the low-end of GVCs (tangible activities) 
led by multinationals and would thus be likely to adopt very aggressive (somehow radical) 
innovation strategies to support their firms on more intangible activities (R&D, design, 
finance, and marketing) (see Cheng et al., 2020). Therefore, as shown in our paper, more 
Chinese domestic firms, especially high value-added services suppliers have been able to 
climb up the ladder to the high-end and enjoy more value-added gains directly and 
indirectly upstream in GVCs. In other words, the quickly increasing presence (or value-
added gain) of Chinese firms in GVCs (meaning the relatively shrinking influencing 
power of the U.S.) might be another possible trigger for the U.S.–China trade conflicts. 
Therefore, the nature of the current U.S.–China trade conflicts may be similar to 
judgments coming from international politics literature: “relative gains are more 
important than absolute gains” (Waltz, 1959); “the first concern of states is not to 
maximize power but to maintain their position in the system” (Waltz, 1979). 
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Appendix 1 Country/region code in the OECD, Analytical AMNE Database 
    
OECD code OECD countries Non-OECD code Non-OECD economies 
AUS 1 Australia ARG 37 Argentina 
AUT 2 Austria BRA 38 Brazil 
BEL 3 Belgium BGR 39 Bulgaria 
CAN 4 Canada CHN 40 China (People's Republic of) 
CHL 5 Chile COL 41 Colombia 
CZE 6 Czech Republic CRI 42 Costa Rica 
DNK 7 Denmark HRV 43 Croatia 
EST 8 Estonia CYP 44 Cyprus4 
FIN 9 Finland IND 45 India 
FRA 10 France IDN 46 Indonesia 
DEU 11 Germany HKG 47 Hong Kong, China 
GRC 12 Greece MYS 48 Malaysia 
HUN 13 Hungary MLT 49 Malta 
ISL 14 Iceland MAR 50 Morocco 
IRL 15 Ireland PHL 51 Philippines 
ISR 16 Israel5 ROU 52 Romania 
ITA 17 Italy RUS 53 Russian Federation 
JPN 18 Japan SAU 54 Saudi Arabia 
KOR 19 Korea SGP 55 Singapore 
LVA 20 Latvia ZAF 56 South Africa 
LTU 21 Lithuania TWN 57 Chinese Taipei 
LUX 22 Luxembourg THA 58 Thailand 
MEX 23 Mexico VNM 59 Viet Nam 
NLD 24 Netherlands ROW 60 Rest of the World 
NZL 25 New Zealand   
NOR 26 Norway   
POL 27 Poland   
PRT 28 Portugal   
SVK 29 Slovak Republic   
SVN 30 Slovenia   
ESP 31 Spain   
SWE 32  Sweden   
CHE 33 Switzerland   
TUR 34 Turkey   
GBR 35 United Kingdom   
USA 36 United States   
Source: ReadMe_analytical AMNE.xlsx from the OECD (https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/amne.htm) 
                                                        
4 Footnote by Turkey:  The information in this document with reference to “Cyprus” relates to the southern part of 
the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey 
recognizes the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within 
the context of the United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the “Cyprus issue”.  Footnote by 
all the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European Union: The Republic of Cyprus is recognised 
by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the 
area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. 
5 The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities or 
third party. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East 
Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in theWest Bank under the terms of international law. 
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Appendix 2 Industry (sector) code of the OECD AMNE ICIO data 
   
Code 1 Code 2 Industry 
A 1 Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
B 2 Mining and extraction of energy producing products 
C10T12 3 Food products, beverages and tobacco 
C13T15 4 Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products 
C16 5 Wood and products of wood and cork 
C17T18 6 Paper products and printing 
C19 7 Coke and refined petroleum products 
C20T21 8 Chemicals and pharmaceutical products 
C22 9 Rubber and plastic products 
C23 10 Other non-metallic mineral products 
C24 11 Basic metals 
C25 12 Fabricated metal products 
C26 13 Computer, electronic and optical products 
C27 14 Electrical equipment 
C28 15 Machinery and equipment, nec.  
C29 16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
C30 17 Other transport equipment 
C31T33 18 
Other manufacturing; repair and installation of 
machinery and equipment 
DTE 19 
Electricity, gas, water supply, sewerage, waste and 
remediation services 
F 20 Construction 
G 21 Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles 
H 22 Transportation and storage 
I 23 Accommodation and food services 
J58T60 24 Publishing, audiovisual and broadcasting activities 
J61 25 Telecommunications 
J62T63 26 IT and other information services 
K 27 Financial and insurance activities 
L 28 Real estate activities 
MTN 29 Other business sector services 
O 30 Public admin. and defence; compulsory social security 
P 31 Education 
Q 32 Human health and social work 
RTS 33 
Arts, entertainment, recreation and other service 
activities 
T 34 Private households with employed persons 
Source: ReadMe_analytical AMNE.xlsx from the OECD (https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/amne.htm) 
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Appendix 3 Robustness check for the GVC position index 
 
To check the robustness of our GVC position index proposed in Section 2.3, we calculate 
the distance from sectors by firm type to consumers of a specific product for all countries 
and years covered in the OECD’s AMNE–ICIO data. Our conclusion is that although the 
evolution of industrial and trade structures might impact this position index, the general 
positions of most industries by firm type are unlikely to change frequently or 
significantly because the most important determinants of position are the inherent 
properties of an industry.  
Given space limitations, we merely present one example as shown in Figures 
A1 and A2, which represent the distance of all countries, industries, and firms to 
consumers of Chinese firm-made ICT products between 2005 and 2016. The larger the 
position indicator (the darker the color represented on the right side) the more upstream 
the position of the relevant industry and firm in the value chain. 
 
 
Figure A1. GVC position index for 2005 
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Figure A2. GVC position index for 2016 
 
Appendix 4 Statistical significance of the measured smile curves 
 
We test the significance of smile curves for both China and the U.S. ICT export-related 
value chains during the entire data period (2005–2016) using a weighted quadratic term 
regression: 
 
vi = α + β1Di + β2Di
2 + ϵi 
 
where vi is the value-added ratio (Y-axis) of a participant i who is involved in Chinese- 
or U.S.-owned firms’ ICT value chains, α is the fixed effect, Di is the position (X-axis) 
of participant i in the measured value chain (based on a normalized distance measure 
given in Equation 2) and ϵi is an error term. As shown in Tables 1 and 2, most value 
chains measured appear as U-shaped curves except for the value chain concerning U.S. 
domestic firms. In the following sections, we provide a detailed explanation. It should be 
noted that the sample upstream is 4,080 strong (60 economies×34 sectors×2 types of 
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firms); the sample downstream is 240 strong (60 economies×2 sectors (transportation 
and commerce) ×2 types of firms). However, the number of observations may be smaller 
than the total sample size. This is because we only count the participants who have 
enjoyed value-added gains because they joined the corresponding value chain. 
 
Table 2a. Testing the smile curve for ICT export-related value chain (2005) 
 
 USA_D13 USA_F13 CHN_D13 CHN_F13 
FE 0.51 *** 
(0.49 – 0.53) 
0.84 *** 
(0.81 – 0.86) 
1.11 *** 
(1.08 – 1.13) 
1.10 *** 
(1.07 – 1.13) 
dis 0.01  
(-0.00 – 0.01) 
-0.15 *** 
(-0.16 – -0.14) 
-0.26 *** 
(-0.27 – -0.25) 
-0.27 *** 
(-0.28 – -0.26) 
dis^2 0.00  
(-0.00 – 0.00) 
0.01 *** 
(0.01 – 0.01) 
0.02 *** 
(0.02 – 0.02) 
0.02 *** 
(0.02 – 0.02) 
Observations 4,087 4,095 4,087 4,095 
R2 / R2 adjusted 0.037 / 0.036 0.167 / 0.167 0.382 / 0.382 0.369 / 0.369 
* p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
 
Table 2b. Testing the smile curve for ICT export-related value chain (2016) 
 
 USA_D13 USA_F13 CHN_D13 CHN_F13 
FE -0.05 *** 
(-0.08 – -0.02) 
0.70 *** 
(0.67 – 0.73) 
0.94 *** 
(0.91 – 0.97) 
0.94 *** 
(0.91 – 0.97) 
dis 0.28 *** 
(0.27 – 0.29) 
-0.08 *** 
(-0.09 – -0.06) 
-0.22 *** 
(-0.23 – -0.21) 
-0.23 *** 
(-0.24 – -0.22) 
dis^2 -0.02 *** 
(-0.02 – -0.02) 
0.01 *** 
(0.00 – 0.01) 
0.02 *** 
(0.02 – 0.02) 
0.02 *** 
(0.02 – 0.02) 
Observations 4,115 4,123 4,115 4,123 
R2 / R2 adjusted 0.466 / 0.466 0.045 / 0.044 0.265 / 0.264 0.255 / 0.255 
* p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
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